

AIR WAR COLLEGE

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THE TRAINING OF RESERVE MARINE CORPS LOGISTICIANS
TO SUPPORT THE ACTIVE DUTY FORCES IN OPERATIONAL
LOGISTICS

by

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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Jason B. Corcoran was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in June 1996. He affiliated with the Marine Corps Reserves in May 2000, joining 4th Electronics Maintenance Company, Wichita, Kansas, as Platoon Commander, Headquarters Platoon. In May 2001 he attended Logistics Officer Course, Camp Johnson, North Carolina and graduated in July 2001. After returning from Logistics Officer Course he became the Executive Officer (XO) of 4th Electronics Maintenance Company, Wichita, Kansas. He served as XO until February 2003 when he was activated and assigned to Twenty-Nine Palms, California and served as XO of CSSC 141, the remain-behind element of CSSB-10. Then in June 2003 he forward deployed to Kuwait and Iraq and became the Future Operations Officer for 1st FSSG FWD. In October 2003 he returned to Twenty-Nine Palms and became the Operations officer for CSSB-10 and assisted in the Planning for OIF II, the Marine Corps' return to Iraq for SASO operations. He was demobilized in April 2004 and assumed command as Commanding Officer 4th Electronics Maintenance Company, Wichita, Kansas. Major Corcoran then transferred to Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to serve in the J-7 as a staff officer in the Interoperability department. While attached to SOCOM he successfully completed U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He then transferred to become the S-4 Logistics Officer for 1st Battalion 23d Marines (1/23) headquartered out of Houston, Texas. With 1/23 he deployed to Helmand Province in Afghanistan in 2011 where 1/23 provided security for Camps Leatherneck, Dwyer, and Delaram. He served as the Battalion Commander of Combat Logistics Battalion 25 (CLB-25). Lieutenant Colonel Corcoran holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering from the Wichita State University in Wichita, Kansas. LtCol Jason B Corcoran is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL.

Abstract

In today's environment, learning how to fight in a joint environment is imperative. Marine Logisticians in the future, especially in the reserves, must learn to fight in the joint environment. With the dwindling force structure of all the armed forces, especially the Marine Corps, having competent reserve Marine logisticians available for future operations is of critical importance. Extra responsibilities fall on reserve Marine Logisticians that will be filling in the shortfalls at the operational and theater level. New steps have been implemented that will see reserve Marine Logisticians filling roles at the Marine Forces level. These Marines must be prepared to step into roles at short notice and become effective quickly. The 4th Marine Logistics Group, the organization that oversees all reservist logisticians, must identify promising individuals to fill these roles. But even on the active duty side of the Marine Corps there are gaps in operational level and joint logistics training and experience. There are new initiatives which are attempting to fill this educational gap. The Marine Corps reserves must use unique and inventive ways to education and retain reserve Marine logisticians to fill these billets. In order to achieve these goals there must be positive steps taken in sending the appropriate reserve Marines to the appropriate schools and then incentivizing them through career progression entitlements to retain them. The use of the joint capability that the US will deploy dictates that educated and competent logisticians must be in place to provide sustainment to the forces fighting the battles.

Introduction

Marine Corps operations in the future are fraught with unknowns; we must, as a fighting force, prepare for as many contingencies as possible. No matter where the Marine Corps deploys in the future, operations will be increasingly fought in a joint environment. No matter the crisis, Marines will be reaching back logistically through the Navy or Army. Marine logistics is moving to a concept known as Seabasing. This concept will allow sustainment and replenishment from the sea so that troops and material do not have to rotate back to the homeland. This concept will require Marine logisticians to concentrate on working with the Navy Logistics Integration (NLI). Marines must also be prepared for a steady state mission, similar to what we have fought during the last fourteen years; Marines will be working with theater-level logistics which is run by the Army. In *Expeditionary Force 21* (EF21), the future concept by which the Marines will deploy and fight, logistics plays an important role. As stated in EF21, “To assist in planning for future operations, the Marine Corps is a full participant in all joint logistics developments—aligning both NLI and other Marine Corps processes and technologies to take advantage of the synergies that will result from the myriad of joint and allied initiatives and capabilities.”¹ Stated another way, the combined effort of the Navy-Marine Corps team will need to promote synergies in the ever complex joint and allied environment to promote the national interest of the United States. Marine logisticians must understand how logistics is conducted in a joint environment. It is critical that joint doctrine and procedures are understood by these Marines.

The Marine Force Reserve (MARFORRES) will play an important role in the future of Marine Corps operations. As stated by Lieutenant General Richard Mills, MARFORRES commander from 2013-2015, “The Marine Corps Reserve remains an integral part of the Total

Force Marine Corps and continues to serve as an operationally-focused force whether it is integrated with Marine forces in Afghanistan, serving as a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, or filling training and advising roles with security force assistance teams in direct support of combatant commanders' requirements."² The reserves support the active duty force in many ways: sometimes with partial or complete units, but many times with individual augmentees. This statement illustrates that all reserve Marines must be prepared. Each unit in MARFORES and each individual Marine must identify what they will "bring to the fight," and prepare for that mission. The Marine Corps reserve logistics community must provide training and education in joint doctrine and systems to ensure they are prepared to work within the Marine Force (MARFOR) components on "day one" of their activation to assist the joint force in all logistic functions. This paper endeavors to create an understanding of how the Marine Corps has fought battles in the recent past to form an understanding of what gaps have been created that must be filled. It will give observations to understand how the Marine Corps arrived in the situation that we face today. Then, it will explore the efforts that are taking place to fill these educational gaps and provide solutions. When explored in more depth, these efforts may assist in getting Marine reserve logisticians where they need to be in order to support the Marine Corps components at the operational level and geographic combatant commands.

Relevance and Background

Most experts assert that future contingencies will be fought in a joint environment. The Marine Corps reserve logistics community will become more important to the fight due to a dwindling active duty force. For the Marine Corps reserve logistician to be relevant in future strategic and theater operations, they must be educated in joint operations and prepared to operate in a joint environment as part of a joint force. There is currently little education for

Marine reserve logisticians to provide support at the operational or theater-level. These logisticians will be working with the strategic and theater-level logistics provided by the Army and Combatant Commands.

In the past fourteen years the Marine Corps reservist has been operating with the active duty in a steady-state environment. The logistics community set standards and procedures that were specific to Iraq and Afghanistan. In this environment where operations became routine, a level of complacency evolved. The Marine Corps logistics community worked closely with the Army in this joint environment. As stated by Captain Robert Mann, an Army logistician, in *Army Logistician*, “As lessons from Iraq emerge, logistics will change to ensure that combat troops are able to fight the enemy and not have to fight the supply and distribution system. Joint distribution will be required in the future. However, experience in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has demonstrated that command and control problems are a significant obstacle to achieving intratheater joint distribution.”³ The Marine Corps will have to develop logisticians that are more adept at working with theater level-logistics while still maintaining our strength at the tactical level. The glue that binds all logistics in an operational area is the joint doctrine that will guide how all forces will work together. Additionally, each service component has their own doctrine that defines how they will each conduct their logistics according to their specific roles. For instance, the Marine Corps is known as an expeditionary force ready at a moment’s notice. The Marine Corps works closely with the Navy, so the Marine Corps logistics doctrine will be different than the Army’s due to this naval tradition. Although there are similarities between Army and Marine Corps logistics doctrine at the tactical level, the Army controls the theater-level logistics and above, which makes the Army doctrine different from the Marine Corps.

It is important to understand how the Marine Corps reserve plans to support the Marine Force Commanders. Marine logistical support ranges from individual augments to small team-based units that activate to support any number of contingencies around the world. For instance, in Korea the 4th Marine Logistics Group (MLG) is working closely with MARFOR Korea in supplementing the G-4 shop in case hostilities break out in that area. Service specific training and command relationships are important to understand in order to select the correct method of supporting the MARFOR. Following this determination, individual logisticians must be trained using compatible doctrine and Joint systems. Even though the concept of logistics support may be the same across the services, it is important to understand all the responsibilities and systems that will be employed at the operational and theater level.

In order for the Marine Corps logistics community to be relevant at the operational and theater level, it must analyze its training and organizational gaps. Training and billet selection must be conducted and coordinated to ensure the active duty component is being supported.

Operational Level Logistics

Operational level logistics is defined and described within the doctrinal publication *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 4-12 Operational-Level Logistics*. A tenant of modern operational logistics is “MARFOR logistic planners coordinate with other Services, Department of Defense (DOD) logistic agencies, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to meet requirements. Joint force operations may interact with interagency organizations, especially during military operations other than war (MOOTW).”⁴ During our recent wars the Marine Corps has identified gaps within its operational level logistics capability. An Operational Advisory Group (OAG) was created to determine these gaps and identify the steps necessary to repair them. The OAG met early in August 2014 and identified three areas

they determined needed further analysis: staffing, concepts of logistics support to the MARFOR, and command and control of MARFOR logistics.⁵ Although all three areas are important, one imperative takeaway was staffing. For Marine reservists, the importance and relevance of staffing the correct Marines into essential logistics billets is critical in order to ensure adequate support to the active duty force. Marine leaders must make sure there is appropriate and relevant training in the areas of doctrine and systems for these staffing requirements.

Doctrine

Per Marine Corps doctrine, Marines are responsible for their own logistics at the operational level and below. This is highlighted in *MCWP 4-12 Operational-Level Logistics* “...the MARFOR coordinates operational logistic support for the MAGTF per Marine Corps Service responsibility and for other Service components as directed by the JFC.”⁶ When working for a Combatant Commander, the situation may change depending on the number of forces within that area of operations from each service. But above the operational level, the Marine Corps must work with the Navy or Army at the theater level or higher. There are three main doctrines that will drive the logistics for Marines in an operational area: Joint, Army, and Marine Corps doctrine. Each doctrine will discuss the basics of logistics, but they are all needed to understand the responsibilities and command and control of logistics under the combatant commander.

Joint logistics doctrine is located in *Joint Publication (JP) 4.0 Joint Logistics*. This publication describes the doctrinal basis for logistics in a joint environment. As stated within the publication “This publication is intended to provide guidance to JFCs and staffs, their subordinate component commands, and combat support agencies (CSAs) for joint logistics operations including the incorporation of interagency and multinational elements.”⁷ One of the

most crucial steps in joint logistics is grasping the roles and responsibilities of all parties within the joint force. The Marine Corps Component Commander coordinates strategic level logistics support. Joint logistics requires coordination between all the services to support the forces in the area of operations. According to JP 4-0 the Army handles the theater sustainment command (TSC). This is the logistics command and control element within a theater of operation. As an example, when the Marine Corps area of operations was Helmand Province in Afghanistan, the TSC handled the flow of ground supply from the ports in Pakistan that made their way to Camp Leatherneck. Even though most of these convoys were made by civilian trucking companies, the coordination was handled by TSC. Such cooperation intensifies the need for Marine logisticians to understand the doctrine and systems in a joint environment. Reserve Marines supporting the deployed MARFOR must have the proper training to be effective in the joint environment. It is imperative for those Marine logisticians working at the operational level and above to understand Army process because it is impossible to conduct logistics at those levels without understanding the Army's processes.

Marine Corps doctrine is governed by Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs), Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs), and Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs). These publications provide concepts and guidance for planning and executing Marine Corps operations. *MCDP 4 Logistics* is the top level publication that provides theory and philosophy for Marine logisticians.⁸ It also helps Marines understand the basic fundamentals of logistics. This publication was last released in 1997. It is in need of revision to help Marine logisticians understand the complex nature that we fight in today. The document does discuss the need for Marines to understand operational level logistics and the need to coordinate with joint or other services, but does not provide enough guidance on working in a joint environment.

MCWP 4-1 Logistics Operations gets into deeper logistical discussions. This publication discusses the nature of joint logistics operations in more depth. It provides more detail at the operational and theater level logistics staff action, to plan and conduct logistics at the operational level. This publication describes, in general terms, the responsibilities and relationship that Marines at the operation level must have with higher and adjacent commands in theater. But there is little detail in describing the actual relationship, which a Marine in the G-4 shop in a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), must have with the Joint Force Commander (JFC). The Marine Corps recently implemented Global Command and Control System Marine Corps (GCCSMC) which gives Marines a single point of entry for all logistics operations and improved access to timely information to assist the commander in making better-informed decisions. Although the Marine Corps has implemented this system to provide better support in joint operations, there are still significant differences between the Marine Corps systems and those used at the theater level by the Army and Air Force. Overall, with today's operations becoming more joint there should be more guidance available which details the logistics operations required at the theater level. This can be accomplished by updating doctrine and providing more education on joint logistics.

The Army doctrine is governed by *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 4-0 Sustainment* and works closely with *ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations*. These documents go into depth concerning logistical support to joint operations. *Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0 Sustainment* contains an even deeper discussion of theater logistics. This publication contains a whole chapter discussing joint and theater level logistics. One of the important parts of the Army logistics is the TSC, as discussed earlier. As stated in the *ADRP 4-0 Sustainment* "As the distribution coordinator in theater, the TSC leverages strategic partnerships and joint

capabilities to establish an integrated theater-level distribution system that is responsive to Theater Army requirements.”⁹ The Army has the mission and support personnel to handle theater level logistics. They are typically the lead logistical service for the combatant commander and work closely with the services within a theater. An example of Army inter-service support is the Army’s Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP provides the basic necessities that a base would require to sustain an operating force. For example, during OEF the Marine Corps controlled Camp Leatherneck, a multi-service and multi-national base. However, the Marine Corps relied heavily on support from the Army and Air Force for things like contracting and engineering services to maintain the base. These services were often provided by Army LOGCAP.

When moving forward with the application of logistics to support the warfighter, it is important to understand the basics of logistics: command and control, responsibilities, relationships, and systems that each service brings to the fight. In order to make logistics seamless, higher-level staffs must provide adequate guidance. Guidance should be promulgated by the Combatant Commander’s J-4 staff section. The expectation from the J-4 staff will be that each service provider, through their respective force commanders, will plan and execute in a joint environment. Another expectation is that each service will train their logisticians to be able to function in the joint environment. This explanation is even more important for Marine reservists, who must have proper training before going to work for a Marine Force Commander. Reservists will be joining a group that has already been working as a team in the joint environment and will already have knowledge of the specific theater they have been working in.

Systems

One of the main focuses of a commander is the visibility of logistics. Knowing the status of equipment, supplies, and availability of parts is integral to planning and sustaining any operation. As stated in an Army-Marine Integration Newsletter “In OIF, the inconsistency in providing each of the required preconditions meant that enterprise integration and visibility did not exist. Limited system availability, poor data capture, unreliable communications, inaccessible data, and limited information fusion provided little more than ‘islands’ of visibility in theater.”¹⁰ This text highlights both the complexity of systems, and that the large amount of logistics data in a joint theater provides only snapshots of a logistics status at any given time. There are many issues at work in a joint environment; one is the myriad of systems being used. Another is getting the systems to work for the warfighter. Complex systems tend to be difficult to work with in a combat environment. This systems complexity makes the life of a logistician all that more difficult. The Army and Marine Corps do not use the same systems when it comes to logistics, command and control, and planning. The Army relies on Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) which is the sustainment command and control (C2) system used to fuse sustainment, in-transit visibility (ITV), and force data displayed on a Logistics Common Operating Picture (LCOP) to aid commanders in making critical decisions at all levels.¹¹ The Marine Corps has moved to GCCSMC and is currently trying to implement this system throughout the force. But this system was designed for tactical level and does not integrate with BCS3 to give visibility to the logistician at the operational, theater, or strategic level. Incompatibilities between the Army’s Standard Army Retail Supply System/Standard Army Maintenance System (SARSS/SAMS) and the Marines GCCSMC logistics systems have caused Marines and soldiers to use Microsoft Excel and email in OEF to conduct logistics.¹² In

other words, the systems and large amount of data have become so complex, that Marine and Army logisticians started using basic systems they could better control to understand data and communicate more reliably. This example highlights only one instance, but there are many more complex logistical systems currently being used. It is not only a difficult task to use the systems, but the large amount of data being used and processed at the theater level and above, further complicates the ability to give commanders the appropriate level of visibility in the logistics process. It is imperative for the Marine logistician to be familiar with these systems so that they can use a common language when dealing with Army logisticians in a joint environment.

There must be some type of plan for select reserve logisticians to become familiar with these systems, although it should not be a force wide training plan. Training should be reserved for those Marine augments that will fill the all-important billets supporting the MARFORs. It can be assumed that they will be familiar with the Marine Corps systems, but there is currently no plan to get these Marines acquainted with the Army systems that will be used in theater. Admittedly, Marine reservists already have limited time to train on Marine Corps systems. Regardless, adding additional systems into their training cycle must be considered to be effective at the joint level. This factor is another reason that this specialized training will likely only be offered to Marines identified to augment at the operational level or above.

Reserve Marines in the Fight

The Marine Corps reserve community has answered the call to Marine Forces Command Korea (MARFORK) in developing a strategy to support their operational logistics requirements. This initiative has blossomed into identifying shortfalls across the MARFOR at other combatant commands. This effort further developed into a Service Component Operational Logistics Augmentation Cell (SCOLAC).¹³ This is a new concept that was being discussed between many

different joint and Marine Corps commands in early 2013. The main purpose of SCOLAC is to aid the active duty forces with reserve logisticians to support operational logistics. While the structural change that Marine Force Reserve went through during 2012 was difficult, place holders were found that were utilized to create the SCOLAC concept. This concept is still in its infancy and will take time to develop. The main focus areas of this concept will be training, recruitment, and retention. The main focus, for the last 14 years, has been supporting the tactical level of war in both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and OEF. This new support to the operational level is relevant because the USMC is a joint force provider, within an environment of shrinking forces. This effort is important because it is unlikely, except in a major theater war, that the headquarters of 4th Marine Logistics Group (MLG) will ever deploy as a unit. The more likely scenario is that individual augments will be deployed to support the active duty sourced Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). These augments will most likely be working in a joint environment, or at the MARFOR level, and should be educated to perform in those arenas.

Current Training and Education Trends

The Marine Corps has a long history of training to standards. The most common training standards are the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Training and Readiness (T&R) manuals that describe the training required at the tactical level. T&R training focuses on specific tactical tasks and ensuring capability to complete those tasks. This training does not normally encompass education where broad concepts and critical thinking are required. Training to T&R standards works well at the tactical level, but education is needed for the operational level and above. The Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM) conducted an analysis of Marine Corps logistics training in 2008 and determined that instruction in operational logistics decision making, planning Logistics Combat Element (LCE) command and control (C2), and

effectively operating in a joint and interagency environment were inadequate.¹⁴ In that same study it was found that “individual MOS skill and operational proficiency is high within the LCE.”¹⁵ This study provides evidence that Marines will train to standards very well and can execute those standards with high proficiency. However, at the operational level and above, education should focus on giving logisticians the ability to work within environments that are less about individual tasks and more about concepts and missions. This training becomes more significant to the reserve community. When an active duty Marine goes to work at a MARFOR or joint command they will get on-the-job training and should theoretically become proficient by working within the staff every day. But a reserve logistician will only get training at their respective drill center during a drill weekend. This is hardly the place to get the proper education for operational logistics. At most, they may get to attend one exercise a year, during their annual training, to watch and assist at the operational level or above.

In the past few years the Marine Corps logistics community has been trying to improve logistics education. Marine Corps Logistics Operation Group (MCLOG) was created in order to produce a better and more coherent education to Marines in the logistics field. It “...provides standardized, advanced individual training in MAGTF logistics operations and unit readiness planning at the battalion and regimental levels, conducts Battle Staff Training, facilitates logistics education and manages doctrine, training standards, tactics and institutional training programs in order to enhance combat preparation and performance of Logistics Combat Element units in MAGTF operations.”¹⁶ This mission is wholly focused at the tactical level. There is little consideration given to operational logistics. When looking at the programs offered, joint or interagency environment gets little attention. There are no Marine Corps specific programs that prepare logisticians for the operational or above level. MCLOG schedules Marines to attend

Joint Logistics Course (JLC) and Interagency Logistics Course (ILC) which are courses for education at the operational level and above. The JLC is taught by the Army Logistics University (ALU) and is a two week course that focuses on theater-level joint logistics operations. The Interagency Logistics Course is taught by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and is a one week course that provides up to strategic level overview of interagency disaster logistics.¹⁷ These courses will be important for reserve Marines holding billets within the SCOLAC.

A Relevant Marine Corps Reserve

In order for the reserve Marine logisticians to become part of the fight at this level, there must be a concentrated effort in retention and training. This training should be specialized for the reserves, in the sense that, it is not in the normal scope of advancement for reserve Marine logisticians. The SCOLAC concept helps create the environment for Marines holding key logistics billets to achieve success. This initiative will be a two-step process. First, Marines must receive the proper training. Second, the Marine Reserves must retain them during their billet tour. Since most Reserve Marine officers are not obligated to serve, it is difficult to count on them staying in the billet during the complete tour. Therefore, it would be wise to create an incentive to obligate the Marines for these billets. For example, the billets could be a “payback tour” for Marines who are obligated due to attending a formal school, such as Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

MCLOG has created the environment to help Marines get the proper joint training. MARFORES will need to start leveraging and incentivizing Marines to attend these schools. The schools which best support reserve Marines going into SCOLAC billets are the JLC and ILC. Typically, there are seats available for reserve Marines in these schools, but there must be

an incentive to get those Marines into those classes, and to fill those important billets in the SCOLAC. These incentives can be tied to their billet and a combination of benefits to help retain these Marines.

One of the biggest factors facing reserve Marines is attaining the necessary time to develop the operational skills necessary to be a valuable team member to the MARFOR. It would behoove MARFORRES to create an environment that is appealing from both a career and knowledge standpoint. This can be done by implementing both benefits and career enhancements. The benefits can come from travel reimbursement and flexibility. For instance, since these billets could be considered critical skills, an affiliation bonus could be tied to the billets to keep a high retention rate. This initiative would enhance the ability to retain the Marines in these billets. Without the ability to retain the Marines in these billets, the concept will lose credibility because the best Marines will not be retained at the MARFOR where they are most needed. A constant turnover of Marines in these billets will diminish the support perceived from the MARFORs.

Conclusion

In a 2011 interview, Art Tringali, a strategic planner at Marine Corps Logistics Command, stated “We don’t trust the reserves enough to let them run with the operational level logistics role. They’re written into some of the plans, but there’s a lot of gnashing of teeth sometimes when that’s talked about.”¹⁸ He makes a valid point since the 4th MLG, as a whole, does not get the training required to stay proficient at commanding the Operational Logistics element in a theater, but it is still written into the plans to supplement the active duty force with individuals. The reserves have taken a more important role since 2011 with the downsizing of the Marine Force as a whole. The 2015 *Force Development Strategic Plan* identifies “Develop

joint and service operating concepts” in its commander’s intent section.¹⁹ The requirement to operate in a joint environment, and the need for the reserves to supplement the active duty, have created a sense of urgency in developing the proper coordination between the reserve and active duty communities. This makes the relevancy of the training required for reserve Marines all that more imperative.

The doctrine is in place to provide the necessary procedures, guidance and responsibilities. However, there is room for improvement in some of the doctrine, especially the Marine Corps’. The Army has updated their doctrine to emphasize and reflect sustainment versus logistics, but the key is in the joint information that was formulated in their documentation. This update was recently produced and released which shows that the Army is moving closer to thinking and fighting in a joint environment. There are lessons that could be learned from their doctrine update. The Marine Corps has identified a lack of understanding in operational level of logistics, and in logistics leadership, in both the reserve and active duty community, and are taking steps to fill these gaps. These gaps have been identified by the OAG that is working on Operational-Level Logistics issues. The OAG will continue to develop new process improvements to assist the Marine Corps in conducting operational level logistics.

Reserve Marines must get the proper training to support this expanding mission. The need for improvement was demonstrated by the creation of MCLOG. Initial steps have been made in coordinating training for Marine logisticians to get theater-level logistics training opportunities. For example, a MCLOG information paper created in 2013 shows a chart (figure 1) delineating a relationship between rank and levels of war. Its purpose is to highlight training Marine logisticians can obtain to make them better warfighters in the joint environment.²⁰ The graphic also clearly highlights the gap in education with respect to joint doctrine, Army doctrine,

and Army logistics systems.




Figure 1

There must be incentives put in place to keep the reserve Marines filling the SCOLAC billets. This goal can be reached through incorporating monetary incentives, such as bonuses, or through cultural incentives such as making these billets a top priority for recruiting the best senior logisticians in MARFORRES. This new concept is good for the Marine Corps as a whole. It will make us a better fighting force in the joint environment. But without the proper attention to the training and billet retention, mission readiness to fight in a joint environment could be negatively affected.

Notes

¹ *Expeditionary Force 21 Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 2014.

² Lt Gen Richard P. Mills, Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (2014 Congressional testimony) marforres.marines.mil/portals/116/docs/CONGRIT/, accessed 15 Oct 2015.

³ Robert P. Mann, "Improving Intratheater Joint Distribution." *Army Logistician* 36, no. 3 May-June, 2004): 3-5.

⁴ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Operational-Level Logistics. MCWP 4-12*. Washington, D.C: Headquarters Marine Corps, January 30, 2002.

⁵ Logistics Advocacy Newsgam, Issue #01, 12 Dec 2014

⁶ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Operational-Level Logistics. MCWP 4-12*. Washington, D.C: Headquarters Marine Corps, January 30, 2002. Pg 1-1

⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Logistics*, JP 4-0. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, July 18, 2008, pg i

⁸ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Logistics. MCDP 4*. Washington, D.C: Headquarters Marine Corps, 21 Feb 1997, Foreword.

⁹ Headquarters U.S. Army, *Sustainment*, ADRP 4-0. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Army, July 2012, pg 2-9.

¹⁰ *Army-Marine Integration, Volume 2, Number 10-55. Observations, Insights, and Lessons*. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2010. pg 70.

¹¹ Dale Farrand. "BCS3: Take Another Look." *Army Sustainment*, July 1, 2010.

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¹³ LtCol Zachary Bennet, Information Paper, 4th MLG Establishment of Service Component Operational Logistics Augmentations Cell

¹⁴ Melvin Speise and LtCol William Wroten Jr, *Logistics Training and Education Gaps: TECOM Analysis Brief*. Nov 2008.

¹⁵ Ibid, pg 13

¹⁶ <http://www.29palms.marines.mil/Units/MarineCorpsLogisticsOperationsGroup.aspx>

¹⁷ Commandant of the Marine Corps. Calendar Year 2015 Marine Corps Logistics Training and Education Opportunities, MARADMIN 567/14, November 4, 2014.

¹⁸ Interview of Art Tringali (strategic planner at Marine Corps Logistics Command) conducted by Scott Kemp (Marine Corps Lessons Learned), 14 April 2011.

¹⁹ Force Development Strategic Plan, produced by Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 29 Oct 2015.

²⁰ Information Paper created by Marine Corps Logistics Operation Group, Prepared by Major R.A. Nail, Operations Officer, Approved by Colonel D.J. Eskelund, Commanding Officer, produced by Marine Corps Logistics Operation Group, 7 Oct 2013.

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